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In the history which I require and design, special care 
is to be taken that it be of wide range and made to the 
measure of the universe. For the worJd is not to be 
narrowed till it will go into the understanding (which 
lias been done hitherto), but the understanding to be 
expanded till it can take in the image of the world, as 
it is in fact. 
Francis Bacon, Parascevc, Aphorism -1 
A code is subject to, indeed demands, a single clear 
decoding or interpretation . . . . In hieroglyph the 
meaning is embodied in the figure itself. This is the 
struggle between the cipherer and the hieroglyphic poet 
in Bacon. He ascribes to myth a double [unction, but 
the two functions turn out to resemble one another, 
each depending on "This stands for that," which is 
cipher and not myth. Deliberately to encode knowledge 
so as to hide it from the vulgar is the task of the 
cipher but never of the myth or poetry. 
Elizabeth Sewell, The Orphic Voice 
Pre-critica1 naivete holds undivided rule. This is why 
modern thought has been unable to avoid--and precisely 
from the starting point of this naive discourse-
searching for the locus of a discourse that would be 
neither of the order of reduction nor of the order of 
promise: a discourse whose tension would keep separate 
the empirical and the transcendental, while being 
directed at both; a discourse that would make it 
possible to analyse man as a subject, that is as a 
locus of knowledge which has been empirically acquired 
but referred back as closely as possible to what makes 
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it possible, as a pure form immediately present to 
those contents; a discourse, in short, which in 
relation to a quasi-aesthetics and quasi-dialectics 
would play the role of an analytic which would at the 
same time give them a foundation in a theory of the 
subject and perhaps enable them to articulate 
themselves in that third and intermediary term in which 
both the experience of the body and that of culture 
would be rooted. 
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things 
Introduction 
and I remember it was more than ten 
years ago so clearly moving so slowly to flush 
my face with cold water waking the night 
punchy from a long sleep looking into the 
mirror where an old friend was doing the same 
in a hurry looking into the mirror and seeing 
together in the same moment our eyes our eyes 
were the same eyes same rootbeer brown with 
flecks of gold and green identically poised 
kaleidoscopes looking into the mirror 
spellbound eyes our eyes looking from one to 
the other full of wonder the same mystery we 
had held since childhood without seeing our 
eyes a living sign unassailable bond a being a 
witness deep transparent matter dense colored 
wonder irises held in silent semiosis eyes 
that do not cipher held existence and 
imagination in silent love affair green waves 
swimming in green waves and this memory too a 
sign a brown jewel in our flesh . . . . 
In Section 3.3.4 of A Theory of Semiotics, called 
"Ideas as Signs," Umberto Eco suggests research 
extending the . limits of his own theory into "the idea 
of 'meaning* found in the phenomenology of perception." 
He suggests comparing that notion of meaning with his 
own notion of the "sememe." This excursus would 
presumably penetrate the lower threshold of semiotics 
separating conventional signs from natural signs and 
signs from things. Now both semiotics and 
phenomenology study cultural units, but whereas 
semiotics accepts them as data, phenomenology looks for 
the various conditions of their formation and so 
confronts the ambiguous dense texts from which the 
explicit messages studied by semiotics arise or descend 
from. These latter texts, from which messages seem to 
descend, can be transcultural in the manner of 
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aesthetic works, and they lie at the upper threshold of 
semiotics. The possibility of comparing semiotics and 
phenomenology at either lower or upper threshold is 
explained, in Eco's theory, by his presumption that 
"every object may potentially become a sign within the 
environment of a given culture," and that not only 
objects but also concepts or ideas can be taken as 
'signs.' Eco's view is that there is a continuum from 
the perceptual experience of tilings to the abstract 
significations of ideas, and that his conception of the 
sememe enables semiotics to transverse this continuum 
quite systematically. For example, "both the word 
/cat/ and the token perceptum //cat// culturally stand 
for the same sememe" interpreted of course under 
different types of code. This is indeed a powerful 
claim. My question is whether or not Eco's conception 
of the sememe, and more importantly that of the 'sign' 
upon which it is based, can support a theory of coder; 
and of sign production which purports to comprehend the 
kind of threshold events or objects that we have just 
been discussing. 
Semiotics according to Eco deals with art, which 
lies at its upper threshold and also its lower, 
primarily as an "under-coding" that works to increase 
the segmentation of both the content and the expression 
continuum. • The surplus of content and of expression 
which transcends current cultural codification is 
correlated by a complex rule, code, ideolect, or style, 
which can be abduced from the aesthetic text by the 
semiotician or other component addressee. For Eco, all 
this occurs on the basis of signification. 
Understanding a work of art means decoding it and 
exhibiting a calculus of its signs. Since works or art 
modify or destroy and replace the standard semantic-
conceptual models of a culture, the truth-conditions 
applicable to a work of art are special. Truth, being 
for Eco a correspondence or at least a connection of 
some sort between signs and factual states of the 
world, is preeminently a function of signification. If 
uncoded facts intrude into a culture, then the truth-
values relevant to those Tacts undergo mutations, as do 
the codes through which they are newly entertained. 
Mere especially, at the upper threshold of semiotics 
which can influence its lower threshold, the question 
as to the capacity of the 'sign' as conceived by Eco to 
sustain the semiotic model without somehow debilitating 
what it attempts to comprehend—this question gains in 
urgency because it does claim to contribute a 
topography of art and truth based on a conception of 
the artistic sign. 
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In light of these summary considerations, I will 
pose my question by (1) demarcating the features of 
Eco's theory most pertinent to the question; (2) 
drawing in a phenomenological perspective on these 
matters; (3) opening up a view of the sign, in terms of 
the artist's own conception, which would seem to 
radically challenge Eco's view; and (4) very briefly 
propose clarification, compromise or re-evaluation of 
the sign with respect to the conception that develops 
out of this discussion. 
Eco's Theory 
Eco's definition of 'sign' is simply this: "I 
propose to define as a sign everything that, on the 
grounds of a previously established social convention, 
can be taken as something standing for something 
else." Already Eco has narrowed down the range of the 
'sign' to apply to a relation between one 'thing' and 
another. Just what kinds of 'things' are to be 
considered in this sign relation is a question we will 
have to ask from the start. It is easily answered by 
noting the bare model of "signification" Eco proposes 
and also his description of the process of 
communication from which that model derives. 
Communication is essentially the passage of a 'signal' 
from some source to some destination. Signals can be 
sent from machine to machine, but in this instance the 
signal is not yet a sign and so there is no 
signification. Signification requires the destination 
to be a person, who not only receives the signal but 
interprets it by means of a code. The code 
systematizes the signal, so that it can be received in 
the absence of those entities which it re-presents or 
"stands for." The necessary requirement for 
signification is therefore the code, which can "foresee 
an established correspondence between that which 
'stands for' and its correlate," the addressee being 
only contingent to the signification process (p. 8 ) . 
This autonomy of the code, and of signification itself, 
is not surprising, given the derived status of the 
"sign." There can be no sign unless the relation 
between the signal and its correlate is explicitated 
for possible human cognition by means of the code. The 
definition of sign is derived from this model of 
communication which makes the systematic relation 
between signal and its correlate primitive with respect 
to signification. 
By itself, the preeminence of the code begins to 
answer our question about what kinds of things are 
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related in signification. In a theory where the code 
assumes so much importance, the sign comes to be 
regarded as a "sign-function," which takes up a role 
within the following general model (abstracted from 
Eco's verbal text): 
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In this model a 'sign' is always a functive "element of 
the expression plane conventionally correlated to one 
(or several) elements of a content plane" (p. 10). 
There is a sign-function only when such a correlation 
exists. Does this mean, then, that the expression 
functives are signs for the content functives? This is 
not quite right. The sign-function establishes "the 
correlation of an abstract element of the expression 
system with an abstract element of the content system" 
(my emphasis), (p. '30), and so we have not gotten to 
the level of the sign yet. By means of the sign-
function model, it is possible for the code to bring us 
to the level of the sign. It is the code that for Eco 
establishes "general types," the functive elements oT 
the model, which are "abstract," and, furthermore, it 
is the code that on this basis can produce the rule or 
rules "which generate concrete tokens, i.e., signs such 
as usually occur in communicative processes" (pp. 50-
51). The sign-function refers to the abstract level of 
the functive, whereas it is the sign or token that 
refers to the concrete level. What we want to notice 
here is that, for theoretical purposes, the sign-
function disolaces the sign as the Focal concept of 
semiotics--due to the necessary requirement that 
expression and content be always mediated by codes. 
This displacement is entrenched when the relation 
between sign-function and code is more fully formalized 
in terms of meaning, the basic unit of which is the 
"sememe." 
The description of the sign-function is incomplete 
without a way of ascribing meaning to it. Since for 
Eco the sign function is a relation or co-relation, 
meaning lies here, in the nexus transversed by the 
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correlata. This nexus is the sememe: the sememe 
serves as the pivot between a sign-functive of the 
expression plane and a sign-functive of the content 
plane. Its Janusian posture thus enables it to be the 
referent of the bivalent sign-function. Moreover, 
since the sememe is always conventionally coded, the 
sememe must be seen as a cultural unit. This situation 
constitutes an even more radical revaluation of the 
concept of sign. Semiosis, as the study of "signs," in 
effect eliminates the theoretical concept of the "bare 
object," throws out the "thing." The denotatum of the 
various sign-functions is the sememe, and abstract 
entity. As Eco puts this, "Every attempt to establish 
what the referent of a sign is forces us to define the 
referent in terms of an abstract entity which moreover 
is only a cultural convention" (p. 66). The sememe is 
"the meaning to which the code makes the system of 
sign-vehicles correspond" (p. 67). The "things" 
themselves are known through the sememe which the 
communicative processes inserts into a culture "in 
place of things" (p. 66). 
Eco's theory of the sign whose meaning is the 
sememe leads to a global feature of semiotics that I 
also want to call attention to. This feature has to do 
with the "interpretant." Interpretants are, so to 
speak, sign-mirrors which can themselves be regarded as 
signs: the sememe can be analyzed in terms of another 
sememe; signs and sememes can be treated as 
interpretants for other signs and sememes, including 
all their denotations and connotations. Eco says of 
interpretants that "they can be complex discourses 
which not only translate but even inferentially develop 
all the logical possibilities suggested by the sign" 
(p. 70). The sememe is part of a cultural system, of 
the "logic of culture" whose theoretization is the 
raison d'etre of Eco's book (as he says in the first 
sentence of his Introduction: "The aim of this book is 
to explore the theoretical possibility and the social 
function of a unified approach to every phenomenon of 
signification and/or communication."). And there is 
even a global semantic universe encompassing each 
cultural system, so that the mirroring of sign by sign 
is virtually infinite in range at the same time that 
each sign can be fully meaningful. Taking these 
characteristics together, we get the global semiotic 
feature of "infinite semantic recursivity," and 
therefore a genuine semiotics working with an open 
system, an open series of signs, a semiosis that is 
self-explanatory. So it seems. But we must bear in 
mind the dominance of the sign-function in the theory, 
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its dominance over the sign as well as over 'tilings' 
themselves. 
When Eco turns from the theory of codes to the 
theory of sign production, he addresses himself more 
directly to the work of art, under which he subsumes 
one of the four modes of sign production, namely that 
of invention. The artist is a sign producer who 
"posits" the correlation between the elements of an 
expression and a selected content because no previous 
convention exists to establish the correlation. At 
least this is how Eco depicts the artist at the 
beginning of section 3.6.7, "Invention." But within 
the first few pages of exploring this mode of sign 
production, the very concept of the sign-function is 
brought to a crisis, because at times in artistic 
invention—for example in the Gainsborough painting--it 
seems that "there is neither pre-established expression 
nor pre-established content, and thus no correlation 
between functives to permit signification" (p. 7.50). 
How can there be a sign-function when the functives 
between which a correlation could be posited do not 
even exist? Eco answers this by showing how an 
exploratory activity of code-making generates a sign-
function by organizing a "raw" content-conti niumi 
preceptually and then gradually mapping the percepta 
into an expression-continuum. In this case the sign 
has some kind of grip in content. However, in cases of 
"radical" invention, the sign-function does not exist 
at all. It cannot exist because in this type of 
invention there is no perceptual model to work with: 
the expression emerges first and makes possible a 
perceptual model and finally the percepta. Until this 
sequence is fulfilled, there is no guarantee that a 
sign-function will be possible, and if it is, if a 
sign-function does emerge, it will be not a simple unit 
but a complex text with many points of contact with 
cultural conventions. In radical invention, too, the 
sign has a grip in something sold—the code. For even 
when code-making is radical enough to by-pass 
perception and translate the new code directly onto the 
expression plane, this activity relies on previous 
codes. (Semantic recursivity is diachronic. ) The 
"sign" has roots far deeper than intimated in our 
initial exposure to the sign-function model. 
Before demarcating any further those features of 
Eco's general theory pertinent to the question raised 
in my introduction, I should vectorialize the main 
aspects of the disscussion so far, as economically as 
possible. 
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The work of art pushes semiotics to the thresholds 
of cognition and perception, to the thresholds of 
meaning on both expression and content planes 
simultaneously. The result is a dissolution of the 
sign-function but not of the sememe, since a "standing 
for" relation is upheld within a culture by means of 
codes. Because codes are historical-cultural 
functions, signification as such remains in an open 
system of meaning which is infinitely recursive or 
self-mirroring. As a culturally coded unit, the 
sememe-system is abstract and autonomous, and therefore 
it floats beneath the sign-function and its token 
instances as a generative matrix which makes possible 
the distinguishability of the expression and content 
planes of which the sign-function is a correlation. 
But a problem arises when in radical invention, the 
code itself, upon which all these aspects of 
signification depend, has to be created. Code 
invention operates at both thresholds: where things 
become perceptually meaningful and where new sememes 
are introduced into a culture. The question at this 
stage, then, is how is a radical code-making possible. 
So far Eco's answer is that "Man is continually making 
and re-making codes, but only insofar as other codes 
already exist." 
Eco is finally forced to displace the fundamental 
notion of the 'sign' by the code. In fact, he actually 
says "there are no signs as such," and that often what 
we take to be signs are actually coded texts too dense 
to decipher. Somehow this is what we expected from the 
moment the sign was derived from the signal: the 
difference between the two was the intervention of the 
human being. This was a ruse, for the human being soon 
became an abstract representative of culture, like the 
code. Indeed, the code usurped the place of the person 
too. For Eco, man is a sign (p. 316). But what if it 
is the other way around? 
If we follow Eco further, into the sections on the 
aesthetic text, these remarks and suspicions will be 
clarified. When we inquire about the passage from the 
"unshaped perceptual continuum" to a transformative 
realization of expression, to the perceptual model and 
then to a semantic model—this is the sequence for 
radical code invention—we are at a level where "the 
matter of the sign-vehicle becomes an aspect of the 
expression form" (p. 266). At this level it is the 
relation of the "token matter" of a sign-vehicle (note 
we are not speaking of sign-functions) to the 
expression-continuum that is pertinent to semiotic 
analysis. This relation has to do with the 
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signified, between the body and verba] expression, 
between the work of art and "super-existence," between 
"emblems" and Being, and where he recognizes that "What 
we mean is not before us, outside all speech, as sheer 
signification. It is only the_excess of What we live 
over what has already been said" (which is, perhaps, 
another way of describing "extracoding"). Merleau-
Ponty gave careful attention to feeling his way through 
these issues until the end of his life, when he began 
to consolidate his insights into a novel solution of 
them. What he wrote in the last part of the working 
manuscript of The Visible and the Invisible represents 
his clearest formulation of this beginning, so rather 
than crystalizing a rigorously philosophical tete-a-
tete between Eco and Merlcau-Ponty on the ground of his 
earlier explorations, I want to go directly into that 
last formulation, from which we may emerge with a 
considerable loss of naivete with respect to the 
central question of this paper. 
What Merleau-Ponty has to say hears on the problem 
of the sign without focusing on it. He is molding a 
new ontological category through which the question of 
the sign may come to be appropriated, both at the 
threshold of sensuality and at that of 'symbolic' 
expression. After laying out a map of this new 
category, we can go on to interpolate a conception of 
the sign into it. 
The new category is what Merl eau-Ponty calls "the 
flesh" (le chair). What he means by this surfaces in 
his analysis of vision, an analysis rooted in a solid 
"perceptual faith" which tells us that "we see the 
things themselves, the world is what we see."' One 
principle underlies this analysis—the "reversibility" 
of the flesh. 
Seeing is mysterious. The gaze somehow touches the 
things by settling on them, yet the gaze is also a 
"palpation" that is born within them. Take this red 
flower: Does the waving heat between the flower and 
the seer cheat him of a vision that could be better 
seen through a vacuity? Or does the warm air 
contribute to making his vision possible in the first 
place? Perhaps the heat-shimmering is a necessary 
medium and conveyance for this unique meeting between 
seer and seen, a medium which enables them to reach for 
one another? When we ask what this is, for which the 
waving heat is only a metaphor here, the discrimination 
between a "this" and a "that" fades into a single 
'there is' of experience which precedes any separation: 
somehow "the look is itself incorporation of the seer 
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"culturation of matter," which means coding it. Here 
two processes go on at the same time: the 
conventionalization of the material content and the 
conventionalization of the formal expression. Thus the 
relation has to do with the culturalization of 
expression also. It is certainly appropriate that the 
code-making has two hands, one molding each side of the 
double continuum, yet something seems peculiar about 
this in that what was previously treated as distinct 
continua—expression and content—now seems to have 
been melted by the heat of creation into a single 
cauldron of "hyposemiotic stuff" (p. 268). The code-
making activity of the artist is possible because the 
"stuff" does not consist of bare things but of a fusion 
of expression-content: the stuff is coded. This is 
why Eco speaks of the aesthetic work as an overcoding 
in these sections and as an undercoding in other 
contexts (for example, in 2.14: "Thus overcoding 
proceeds from existing codes to more analytic sub-codes 
while undercoding proceeds from non-existent codes to 
potential codes . . . . Aesthetic judgements . . . are 
very deceptive cases of undercoding."). Thus the term 
"extra-coding" is preferred in difficult cases of 
aesthetic invention where the two modes of coding, like 
the two modes of signification, are intertwined and the 
type-token ration is dificilis (i.e., the expression-
type coincides with the coding sememe conveyed by the 
expression-token directly accorded to its content (p. 
183)). 
Eco's description of radical aesthetic invention 
and extra-coding bring our investigation of his concept 
of the 'sign' to its puzzling limits. What is puzzling 
lies in the conclusion that the "standing for" relation 
embodied in the sign is finally squeezed down to the 
point where the relata virtually coincide, apparently 
nullifying the original concept of "standing for." 
This situation clears the path for that excursus into 
phenomenology suggested by Eco himself. The suggestion 
was perspicacious, even if perhaps self-destructive. 
A Phenomenoloqical Perspective: Merleau-Ponty 
Several places in his work, Merleau-Ponty seems to 
start just where Eco leaves off, in order to dispense 
with intelligent but naive notions about signification 
and perception. Still, there are definite overlaps in 
the problems confronted by both thinkers. These 
overlaps are especially evident, from Merleau-Ponty*s 
side, in Signs (listed in Eco's "References"), where he 
excavates the subtle relations between signifying and 
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into the visible, guest for itself, which is of it, 
within the visible" (p. 131n). The ted of the Flower 
has a surface quality (quale) that is there in its 
specific locale, yet the red is also but a lacquer on a 
vision that is bottomless. The quale red helps the 
seer to focus on the flower and to. float above the 
depths into which it draws him. To see the flower is 
to "fix" it into a structure, to solder intoa 
perspective its fluid visibility. And this is true of 
the color's relations with other colors and with other 
perceptual dimensions. The color is a "concretion, not 
an atom," of something more general than itself and 
which contains all dimensions. The eye is an "opening" 
upon a visible world, the hand an "opening" upon a 
tactile world: but the accessibility given in this 
openness must be symmetrical, there must be a kinship 
between the eye that sees and the flower that is seen. 
And since the same body can both see and touch, this 
kinship applies to the various senses too: hand and 
eye, flower and body—all belong to the same world. 
The "perceptual faith" tells us we see the things 
themselves. Rut how is this possible if there seems to 
be this distance between them and us, a distance that 
contradicts their proximity to us when we see and touch 
them? Merleau-Ponty's analysis of vision answers this 
question by insisting that the experience of "depth," 
"dimension," "thickness," etc., be accounted for. The 
answer is to give a name to this same world which hand, 
eye, body, and flower all belong to. This new name 
summarizes a new ontology: "the flesh." With this new 
ontological "element" we being to comprehend how, for 
example, distance complements proximity: "the 
thickness of the flesh between the seer and the thing 
is constitutive for the thing of its visibility as for 
the seer of his corporeity . . . . If is the same 
reason that I am at the heart of the visible and that I 
am far from it: Because it has thickness and is 
therefore naturally destined to be seen by* the body" 
(p. 131n). The thickness of the flesh is the body's 
"dimensionality" (p. 135). In one dimension it can 
see, in another it can be seen, and if lives in both 
dimensions. This dimensionality or double reference 
means that it is the body that gives us the things 
themselves and not flat idealizations, and the body can 
do this becasue it is, simply, of the same element. 
Thus the body can do this because it is, simply, of the 
same element. Thus the body as a "carnal being, as a 
being of depths . . . a being of latency, and a 
presentation of a certain absence, is a prototype of 
Being, of which our body is a very remarkable variant" 
(p. 136). The visible, sensible thing is a being of 
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depth and of dimensionality which assembles into 
concretion (makes concrete) this mystery of the 
scattered visibility of the flesh. The body as 
concretely visible is "pregnant with texture, the 
surface of a depth, a cross section upon a massive 
being, a grain or corpuscle born by a wave of Being" 
(p. 136). It is this two-dimensional body that can go 
into the visible and be at home in it. Body and world 
are of the same flesh, and there can be no strict 
boundary between them. 
The simile Merleau-Ponty uses to describe these 
relations within the flesh is that of two mirrors 
facing one another, in which the receding line of 
images in each mirror represents the interlocking 
reflections first from one and then from the other 
mirror. Here each image is only the rejoinder or 
reverberation of the other. The line of images "belong 
really to neither of the two surfaces" of one mirror or 
the other (p. 139). The seer and the visible belong to 
one another in this way, so that the seer feels as if 
he is being looked at by the things—an experience 
common to many painters. This reciprocity and 
reversibility, "this generality of the sensible in 
itself, this anonymity innate to myself," is what 
Merleau-Ponty means by "flesh" (p. 139). The flesh is 
an element of Being, just as air, earth, fire, and 
water were considered by the ancients to be elements. 
Flesh is what makes a fact be a fact, what makes the 
possibility and exigency for the fact. The flesh is an 
ultimate notion that can be used in describing any 
relation. The very unity of the body, its synergy, is 
instituted by its being flesh, and not, for example, by 
its being organized under a singular consciousness. 
In a beautiful passage which could also be a 
description of love-making, Merleau-Ponty provides an 
impression of the body's insertion in the world as "the 
unique occupation of floating in Being with another 
life, of making itself the outside of its inside and 
the inside of its outside" (p. 144). Here, too, we are 
reminded of "Eye and Mind," where the artist is 
revealed lending his body to the world in order to 
transform the world into paintings. Indeed, Merleau-
Ponty goes on to say that "henceforth movement, touch, 
vision, applying themselves to the Other and to 
themselves, return toward their source, and in the 
patient and silent labor of desire, begin the paradox 
of expression" (emphasis added, p. 144). The source of 
this "flesh," this ontological vibration that hears 
itself, sees itself, touches itself. The openness of 
the sentient and sensible body upon itself, upon the 
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bodies of others and the body of the world, begins that 
wondrous communication of which art is the most 
luminous example. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the emergence of the flesh as 
expression points to the principle of Reversibility 
operative within the flesh, a new kind of reversibility 
which exhibits the "power" of the flesh. This "power" 
of the flesh is its latent expressiveness, an aspect of 
which is cognition, or, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, 
"thought." Thought is not something different than the 
flesh; rather, it is merely the invisible side of the 
flesh. Merleau-Ponty begins his characterization of 
thought by recoiling upon his previous conception of 
the flesh, emphasizing once again its depth and 
dimensionality and associating thought with these. 
Whereas he has previously delved into the similarities 
between the seer and the seen, now he ruminates on the 
contrasts between them. On the one side, the visible 
displays a constant style of visibility. The facing 
mirrors of vision and the visible form a system, wherin 
the flesh returning to itself is not an exotic chaos 
but something basically stable. There is a constancy 
and self-containment about visibility which, from the 
other side, does not seem to apply to the seer. The 
visible body of the seer, in the act of seeing, somehow 
remains incomplete, "gaping open." As the medium of 
"subject" and "object," the flesh retains both the 
features of coherence and of incompleteness. The flesh 
is nothing like the union of "body" and "spirit" but is 
simply "a concrete emblem of a general manner of being" 
(p. 147). Further description of vision and touch 
reveals a manner of being in latency, wherein the 
reversibility of the flesh is always only imminent and 
never quite complete: "My left hand is always on the 
verge of touching my right hand touching the tilings, 
but I never reach coincidence . . . either my right 
hand really passes over to the rank of the touched, but 
then its hold on the world is interrupted," or else the 
right hand keeps touching the world so that its 
reversibility is interrupted and the lefthand does not 
touch the right hand's touching back. This gap or 
"spread" within the experience of reversible flesh does 
not, however, indicate a vacuum there, in between; on 
the contrary, it indicates the dimensionality of the 
flesh just insofar as that "spread" is "spanned by the 
total being of my body and by that of the world" (p. 
148). This other dimension is a clue to the invisible 
flesh that is thought, the flesh that is intelligible, 
the "clearing" that fills the gap and unites the 
touching and the touched, the seer and the seen. For 
Merleau-Ponty, thought is the interior horizon of the 
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flesh, a distancing of the flesh from itself that 
allows it to fold back on itself. Thoughts are the 
axes, the lines of force, of the flesh. Thus both 
exterior and interior horizons of the flesh are held 
together by the openness of the flesh that is based on 
its total reversibility and reciprocity. 
From here on, in the last few pages of the text, 
Merleau-Ponty edges his way into what concerns us 
most—"the bond between the flesh and the idea, between 
the visible and the interior armature which it 
manifests and which it conceals" (p. 149). He is 
working toward a new notion of "ideality," one which 
can neither be severed from the sensible nor projected 
as a new 'element.' The power of the flesh resides in 
the transparency of ideas within the heart of the 
sensible. Ideas—thoughts, meanings—are strange 
absences circumscribed in our very flesh and thus able 
to "possess" us. The cohesion of ideas, for example, 
"the moments of the sonata," occur within an ideality 
that has the same kind of cohesion as that of the body 
with its parts or with the world, because it "streams 
along the articulations of the aesthesiological body, 
along the contours of the sensible things" in "a type 
of surpassing that does not leave its field or origin" 
(p. 153). For Merleau-Ponty the field of the origin of 
ideas is the carnal body which they do not leave but 
which they surpass. Ideas are of the flesh, yet they 
surpass the flesh. In this surpassing, says Merleau-
Ponty, lies the miracle of knowlede, of culture, and of 
language. 
It is as though the visibility and sensibility of 
the sensible world were to "emigrate, not outside of 
every body, but into another less heavy, more 
transparent body . . . abandoning the flesh of the body 
for that of language" (p. 153). This emigration does 
not mean that the flesh is left behind but that a new 
horizon is opened up within it. Ideas, meaning, 
language and culture are still the radiations of the 
carnal dehiscence of "wild" Being and still the 
breedings of reversibility. And here Merleau-Ponty 
renews for us our contact with Eco. For we do not, 
with Eco, have to cut off our language from the things 
themselves, nor do we have to cling to a conception of 
signification that makes the "this stands for that" the 
fundamental relation between signifying and signified 
and which synthesizes them and cements their relation. 
No synthesis is necessary since language already 
embodies both the voices and meanings by means of that 
reversibility through which they are of the same flesh. 
If the signifying expression and the signified content 
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are intertwined in the sememe, it is not because they 
are coded. At least this is not the ultimate reason. 
They are intertwined because they are another aspect of 
the reversibility which was for Merleau-Ponty the 
ultimate truth. Furthermore, reversibility is 
openness, the key to the openness that makes sensing 
and sensibility possible. The reversibility of 
signification explains its openness in a way Eco's 
extracoding cannot. His conception of extracoding 
propels us toward the unity of signifying and 
signified, conveying and conveyed, expression and 
content, but also covers up that unity, veils it in the 
code of the sememic interpretation of meaning. The 
coded sememe seems to conceal the carnal texture 
revealed by Merleau-Ponty. Perhaps this is why Eco's 
theory of radical aesthetic invention founders. The 
coded sememe, founded on the sign as a relation to 
"this stands for that," does not reach the key to 
openness. His "sign" betrays the familial intimacy of 
"this" and "that," their common flesh, which, as in a 
false dialectic positing a third term to rejoin the 
other two, is usurped by the code. 
This is as far as we need to go in this stage of 
the discussion. The phenomenological perspective to 
which we were directed by Eco's own suggestions, even 
if barely sketched, at least clarify our concern about 
the limitations of the role of the sign in his 
enterprise. Now we will see if these suspicions can be 
more deeply confirmed by turning what what an artist 
and man of letters has to say to the problem. 
An Artist's Conception: Octavio Paz 
Multiple vehement odor 
Many-Handed body 
On an invisible stem a single 
Whiteness 
Speak listen answer me 
What the thunder-clap 
Says, the woods 
Understand 
I enter by your eyes 
You come forth by my mouth 
You sleep in my blood 
I awaken in your head 
I will speak to you in stone-1anguage 
(Answer with a green syllable) 
I will speak to you in snow-1anguage 
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(Answer with a fan of bees) 
1 will speak to you in water-language 
(Answer with a canoe of lightning) 
I will speak to you in blood-language 
(Answer with a tower of birds) 
4 
This poem, written by one of the great poets and 
thinkers of our time, seems to have exploded from the 
very 11 flesh" of The Visible and Invisible. The first 
quatrain is an image of this flesh, a phantasm of its 
invisible and incandescent unity. The second appeals 
to the language of the body, which is a language of 
things and whose natural verbs are the axes and lines 
of force of speech that is an action as accessible as 
the sound of thunder. "Speak listen answer": there is 
one movement in language and in understanding, that of 
the thundering discharge of a dehiscent Being that 
folds, curls, invaginates upon itself, without pause or 
punctuation. In the third quatrain, vision and speech, 
kiss, birth and transcendence, dreamand reality, mind 
and use all glide and spin in a common incarnation, the 
garden of the flesh. The last eight lines are a tour 
de force of poetic dialectic. Speaking and answering, 
ululation and undulation of living, flow into one 
another and undergo a catalysis. In the skein of 
opposition and equivalence which we ourselves are, in 
the network of openings, the messages lived between the 
grey-uttered opacity of stones and the green vitality 
of words burgeon for a single ear, for a single 
stereoscopic sensuality. The imagery of the poem 
arises from the invisible and ascends toward it by 
means of a vortex of fluidity, yet it remains concrete. 
The startling juxtaposition of images—"snow-language" 
and "a fan of bees," "canoe" and "lightning" and 
"water-language," and especially the images of the last 
two lines—stretch the carnal dimensionality of poetry 
at the same time the images inscribe their cohesive 
meanings into our imagination. The meanings are 
invisible, to be sure, but they are also there in the 
words, and even more are they in the things. The 
images are the meanings, the words, the things. Nature 
and artifice are mixed in this common ebullience and 
melding of lovers, in a common carnal texture. 
For Octavio Paz, the image is the key to human 
existence. What he means by "image" is what Eco means 
by "sign" in the aesthetic sense. But, if we take 
Paz's own considered examination of just what the 
poetic image is, we will have in our hands an 
understanding of the "sign" that shakes the foundations 
of Eco's whole theory of semiotics. We have this 
examination in a section of The Bow and the Lyre called 
"The Image." 
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What Paz says about the image is quickly 
summarized, which is not to say easily understood. An 
image in a poem is first of all a kind of identity. 
The image "unites realities that are opposite, 
indifferent, or far apart," it "subjects the plurality 
of the real to unity." It approximates Aristotle's 
"likely possible," as Paz says. So far this is not 
incompatible with Eco. The poetic image rejects the 
Parmenidean distinction between what is and what is 
not, and in doing so makes room for possibility. In 
Eco's terms, the poetic utterance releases the 
possibilities for new conventions. But this is not 
what Paz means by possibility, which for him is more 
real than any possible convention. To await 
conventionalism is to await the "clear and distinct 
ideas" that are the death of poetry and which exile man 
"from the cosmic flux and from himself" (p. 07). To 
uphold the "this" against the 'that' is to suffer from 
the "horror of the 'other'." Paz's understanding of 
the poetic image denies the "standing for" relation and 
affirms precisely that the image is a case of "this is 
that." He aligns himself with the mystic traditions 
and even appeals to the Sventasvatara Upanishad, the 
most ancient: "Thou are woman. Thou are man. Thou 
are the youth and also the maiden. Thou, like an old 
man, leanst on a staff . . . . Thou are the dark blue 
bird and the green bird with red eyes . . . . Thou 
are the seasons and the seas" (p. 00). This is an 
affirmation of the identity of tilings; Paz maintains it 
is an experience of truth that cannot strictly speaking 
be communicated in language, as ordinarily understood. 
The identity of "this" and "that" is experienced by the 
body, which discourses in images. The images can 
communicate the ultimate identity of "this" and "that." 
This is the poetic enigma: "how the image can say that 
which language, by its very nature, seems incapable of 
saying?" (p. 91). 
Part of the answer to the enigma is that the 
ordinary languages of 'this stands for that' describe 
and represent various versions of the "real," 
segregating certain aspects of things, "segmenting the 
continua," as Eco would say, in order to render them 
distinctly intelligible. The poet, in contrast, does 
not descirbe anything, does not re-present anything; 
rather, "he puts it before us" (Paz, p. 95). By means 
of the image, the poet tries to present things in their 
totality. The image is pregnancy. All semiotic 
communications systems "live in the world of references 
and of relative meanings" (p. 91). In contrast, the 
image is an absolute meaning. To use a paradoxical 
phrase, "the image explains itself" (p. 94). This is 
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not the same as infinite semantic recursivity 
concentrated in a word: "On the contrary, the meaning 
of the image is the image itself: it cannot be said 
with other words . . . . Meaning and image are the 
same thing. A poem has no meaning other than its 
images . . . its images do not lead us to something 
else, but brings us face to face with a concrete 
reality" (p. 94). Poetic meaning is not a nexus 
between a name and a thing nor a nexus between sign-
functions. The image is not a code; it transcends the 
redundancy of relative meanings, outstrips the 'this 
stands for that' relation. The image returns to itself 
from the unknown, finds itself in the other. The image 
is an arrow toward the other and other is also the 
image. 'This is that.' The flesh is its own image. 
Conclusion 
In criticizing Eco, I have tried to present an 
alternative interpretation of the sign, using two 
complementary conceptions of meaning, one based on a 
philosophy of the flesh, the other based on the poetics 
of the image. The alternative interpretation led 
toward an absolutization of the aesthetic sign which 
seems to defy codification. If the image is in some 
sense an absolute, it cannot depend on a code to carry 
it to a shore of meaning. Now it is necessary to give 
a sober appraisal of the critique I have employed and 
to educe some of its more obvious and important effects 
on Eco's predicament. I will be as brief as possible. 
Rebuttal by Eco against Merleau-Ponty and Paz could 
follow any number of tactics. He could retort that 
both Merleau-Ponty and Pax are merely developing 
metaphors that circumvent the existence of codes and of 
the cultural context without which there can be no 
metaphors. Because existence is temporal, the next 
moment supersedes the last and the new expression is a 
supersession of the old: each new moment and each new 
expression are substitutes for previous ones. The 
metaphor is a substitution of one sememe or system of 
sememes for another (p. 109, 280). A new metaphor is 
essentially a new paradigm for perceiving and 
expressing reality. The "flesh" may be an interesting 
literary description for the medium human history 
passes through and even a description of its substance. 
Nevertheless, that flesh is structured. It is coded. 
The interior armature of the flesh is always situated 
in a culture, a culture which acts as a filter or 
perhaps a prism in virtue of which human life takes on 
its shifting colorations. Existence conceived as 
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absolute would be colorless and lacking in the riotous 
diversity made possitbel by relationships and by the 
deflexivity of representation and mirror. Were we to 
be immediately in touch with the 'tilings themselves, ' 
our imaginative function would be sterile. There would 
be no room for invention but only for inaccuracy and 
dream. The flesh and the image present us with a 
textual thematic so individualized it has to be 
decoded, and until it is we have only a paradigm that 
is held together by a potential code, temporarily 
diffused in expression-clusters and content-nebulae. 
The sign has to be a relative concept, representing a 
"this" standing for a "that," otherwise the ideologies 
which a sign distills would also have to be taken as 
absolutes. What could be the source of the 
corrigibility of signs other than their system of 
codification? 
Another tactic of rebuttal would be to polemicize 
the nature of the transcendence imputed to flesh and 
image. For Merleau-Ponty transcendence is constituted 
by the flesh's openness upon Being, by its exterior and 
interior horizon structure. Yet a horizon is possible 
only on the basis of an "upon which" in relation to 
which a horizon can be contrasted. Similarly, the 
image presupposes a "this" upon which a "that can be 
projected and in relation to which it can be recognized 
as same or different. Culture and code are necessary 
for the initial polarity that renders any subsequent 
identity intelligible as a possible identity of "this" 
and "that." The reversibility of the flesh and the 
self-explanatory nature of the image are merely 
metaphors for the double function of coding and explain 
transcendence in a similar but not more fundamental 
way. This double function is the power to mediate 
between conveying system and conveyed system. And, 
after all, do not the flesh and the image play the same 
role? Are not perception and expression (thought or 
language) mediated by the flesh? Are not the old and 
the new understanding, this self and that other self, 
mediated by the image? Transcendence may be an arrow 
that shoots through the flesh or through the image, but 
this possibility arises from the fact that it is 
directed and directed systematically. That arrow 
passes through a code and transforms it. Some code was 
there at the start and some code remains, albeit a new 
one. 
Furthermore (Eco could continue), the aesthetic 
sign is a component of the process of communication, 
from which I derive my definition of The sign. 
Communication requires explictation of the message, and 
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this means there must be some means by which the 
expression and the content of the message, even if they 
coincide, can be abstracted and represented. A message 
goes to an addressee, who receives the message. The 
message cannot be absolutely concrete. The space 
traversed by the message must be interpersonal and 
public. That space is the coded space of semiotic 
meaning, which is both abstract and representational. 
Without it, communication is a transmission of 
chimeras, promises, dull and burly gropings. 
On Eco's part, we could add to these defenses. But 
they would all be just as useless against the final 
response both Merleau-Ponty and Paz would insist on as 
of the essence of the question. 
For their part, they would simply enunciate the 
empirical fact that has no place in Eco's discourse. 
At the heart of artistic creation, and at the heart of 
the image and of the flesh, glows a perennial mystery: 
The word has its roots in a silence previous 
to speech—a pre-sentiment of language. 
Silence, after the word, is based on language, 
it is an encoded silence. The poem is a 
trajectory between these two silences, between 
the wish to speak and the silence that fuses 
the wishing and the speaking. 
Sometimes the poet calls it silence, sometimes, as we 
have seen, he has other names for it: 
On an invisible stem a single 
Whiteness 
Merleau-Ponty prefers to call it a "clearing" or an 
"openness." But it is here, in this utter compression 
of desire, in this violent implosion that suddenly 
erupts and scatters into visibility and thunder, 
transformed into opaline flecks of color in the eye, it 
is here the sign, the hieroglyph, and not the cipher, a 
vision in truly free space, it is here the sign is 
born. 
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